Abstract
We introduce a general framework to automate the application of countermeasures against Differential Power Attacks aimed at software implementations of cryptographic primitives. The approach enables the generation of multiple versions of the code, to prevent an attacker from recognizing the exact point in time where the observed operation is executed and how such operation is performed. The strategy increases the effort needed to retrieve the secret key through hindering the formulation of a correct hypothetical consumption to be correlated with the power measurements. The experimental evaluation shows how a DPA attack against OpenSSL AES implementation on an industrial grade ARM-based SoC is hindered with limited performance overhead.
Publication
DAC ‘12 Proceedings of the 49th Annual Design Automation Conference

Associate Professor
Giovanni Agosta, Associate Professor at Politecnico di Milano, holds a Laurea in Computer Engineering (2000) and a PhD in Information Technology (2004). His research focuses on compiler-computer architecture interaction, emphasizing performance, energy-efficiency, and security. He has authored 100+ papers, won multiple awards, and participated in 17 EU-funded projects.

Associate Professor
Alessandro Barenghi holds an M.Sc. (2007) and Ph.D. (2011) from Politecnico di Milano. His research focuses on computer, embedded, and network security, particularly applied cryptography. He also works on formal languages and compilers, specifically techniques for parallel parsing using operator precedence grammars.

Associate Professor
Gerardo Pelosi received the Laurea degree in Telecommunications Engineering in 2003 and the Ph.D. degree in Computer Engineering and Information Technology in 2007 from Politecnico di Milano. His research fields cover (1) the area of information security and privacy including access control models, models for encrypted data management in relational databases, and secure data outsourcing; (2) the area of applied cryptography including side-channel cryptanalysis, system-level attacks, and efficient hardware and software design of cryptographic algorithms; other research interests are in designing security support into computer architectures and the logic synthesis of combinatorial circuits.